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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Joshua Lee Bosier appeals from entry of the third amended judgment of 
conviction and order suspending sentence following a remand on appeal of his 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinqs 
Bosier pled guilty to and was sentenced for possession of a controlled 
substance; the underlying course of proceedings was outlined by the Idaho 
Court of Appeals as follows: 
Bosier pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled 
substance, I.C. Ej 37-2732(c). In exchange for his guilty plea, the 
state dismissed additional charges, including an allegation that 
Bosier was a persistent violator. At that time, Bosier was involved 
in four different criminal cases in various stages before three 
different courts. The district court sentenced Bosier to a unified 
term of seven years, with a minimum period of confinement of three 
years. The district court suspended Bosier's sentence and placed 
him on probation for seven years. The district court also ordered 
the sentence to run concurrently with Bosier's sentence in another 
unrelated case for which he had been placed on probation. 
One month later, the district courts summoned Bosier for 
another hearing. At that time, the district court explained that it was 
previously under the mistaken belief that Bosier had a retained 
jurisdiction opportunity in one of his other cases when, in fact, 
jurisdiction had been relinquished. The district court then entered 
an amended judgment of conviction sentencing Bosier to a unified 
term of seven years, with a minimum period of confinement of three 
years. The amended judgment of conviction had the effect of 
revoking Bosier's probation and reinstating the sentence of the 
original judgment of conviction. The district court ordered the 
sentence to run concurrently with all other sentences currently 
being sewed by Bosier. 
One week later, Bosier wrote a letter to the district court 
alleging that it had revoked his probation without cause and asking 
the district court to reduce his sentence. The district court treated 
the letter as an I.C.R. 35 motion to reduce Bosier's sentence. After 
a hearing, the district court entered a second amended judgment of 
conviction modifying Bosier's sentence to a unified term of seven 
years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years. 
State v. Bosier, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 439, pp. 1-2 (Idaho App., April 29, 
Bosier appealed the revocation of his probation (#34745 R., pp. 57-59), 
asserting that the district court violated his right to due process by doing so 
without notice and absent a finding that he had violated any term or condition of 
his probation. (#34745 Appellant's brief, pp. 7-14). The Court of Appeals agreed 
and ordered "Bosier's first and second amended judgments of conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance [ ] vacated" and remanded the case "for 
reinstatement of the original probation." a. at 3. With respect to the second 
amended judgment, the Court of Appeals stated 
Bosier's second amended judgment of conviction which reduced 
the determinate portion of his sentence pursuant to Bosier's Rule 
35 motion is necessarily vacated as it followed the first amended 
judgment of conviction which erroneously revoked Bosier's 
probation. Accordingly, the probation term of his original judgment 
of conviction is in effect, and we do not further address Bosier's 
argument that the district court erred by not further reducing his 
sentence pursuant to Rule 35. 
Bosier's original judgment imposed: 
an aggregate term of seven (7) years, to be sewed as follows: a 
minimum period of confinement of three (3) years, followed by a 
subseauent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed four (4) 
years with said term to run concurrently with Ada County Case No. 
H0400385 said term to commence immediately; 
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that this judgment shall be, and is 
hereby suspended, and the defendant is placed on probation for 
seven (7) years commencing on October 3,2007. . .. 
(#34745 R., p. 43. (emphasis and capitalization original).) Upon remand, the 
district court heard from the parties and, in reinstating Bosier's probation, issued 
a third amended judgment of conviction and order suspending sentence 
imposing: 
an aggregate term of seven (7) years, to be sewed as follows: a 
minimum period of confinement of three (3) years, followed by a 
subsequent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed four (4) 
years with said term to run concurrently with Ada County Case No. 
H0400385, and to run consecutively to the defendant's Canyon 
County sentences. 
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that this judgment shall be, and is 
hereby suspended, and the defendant is placed on probation for 
seven (7) years commencing upon the defendant's release from 
prison. 
(R., p. 12 (emphasis and capitalization original).) Bosier timely appeals. (R., pp. 
Bosier states the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Did the district court lack jurisdiction in this case to alter Mr. 
Bosier's underlying sentence upon remand from the ldaho 
Court of Appeals specifically directing the district court to 
reinstate "the original probation" as ordered in Mr. Bosier's 
original judgment of conviction? 
2. Did the district court err when it increased the aggregate 
term of Mr. Bosier's sentence through filing an amended 
judgment of conviction and sentence when the ldaho Court 
of Appeals did not vacate Mr. Bosier's original judgment of 
conviction and sentence? 
3. Did the district court impose a vindictive sentence when it 
increased the aggregate term of Mr. Bosier's judgment of 
conviction and sentence upon Mr. Bosier's successful 
appeal? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5) 
The state rephrases the issues as follows: 
1. Has Bosier failed to show that the district court was without jurisdiction to 
amend his judgment on remand to indicate whether the sentence originally 
imposed should be consecutive or concurrent to Bosier's other sentences? 




Bosier Has Failed To Show That The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To 
Amend His Judgment On Remand To Indicate Whether The Sentence Oriainally 
Imposed Should Be Consecutive Or Concurrent To Bosier's Other Sentences 
A. Introduction 
Bosier asserts that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
amend his judgment to provide his sentence in this case would run consecutive 
to his Canyon County sentences where the district court failed to indicate in the 
original judgment whether the sentences would run consecutive or concurrent. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-14.) Bosier's argument fails. The Court of Appeals' 
decision remanded Bosier's case for "reinstatement of the original probation." 
Bosier at p. 3. Bosier has failed to establish the Court of Appeals' directive 
precluded the district court from amending the judgment to provide that Bosier's 
sentence in this case will run consecutive to his Canyon County cases because 
there is no basis from which to conclude that "the original probation" was 
concurrent to Bosier's Canyon County sentences. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"'A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when 
brought to [the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to 
considering the merits of an appeal."' State v. Kavaiecz, 139 ldaho 482, 483, 80 
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Enaineerina, Inc. v. ldaho State Bd. of 
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 ldaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 
57 (1987)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free 
review. Kavaiecz, 139 ldaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084. 
The question of whether the sentence imposed is illegal is one of law, 
subject to free review by the appellate court. State v. Hale, 116 ldaho 763, 779 
I 
P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989). 
C. The Issue Of Whether The District Court Exceeded The Scope Of The 
Remand Is Not Preserved For Appellate Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether 
an issue was preserved presents a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 
I 
I Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). Bosier did not object to the 
district court's pronouncement at the hearing upon remand that his sentence was 
to run consecutive to his previously imposed Canyon County sentences and 
I therefore did not preserve his claim of error for appellate review. 
An unpreserved issue may be raised for the first time on appeal if the error 
claimed is fundamental. State v. McAway, 127 ldaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968 
(1995); State v. Lavy, 121 ldaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). 
Fundamental error has been defined as "such error as goes to the foundation or 
basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from 
the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court 
could or ought to permit him to waive." State v. Knowlton, 123 ldaho 916, 918, 
854 P.2d 259, 261 (1993). An error is fundamental when it so profoundly distorts 
the proceedings that it "produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of 
his fundamental right to due process." State v. McCutcheon, 129 ldaho 168, 
169, 922 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Ct. App 1996) (citing Lavy, 121 ldaho at 844, 828 
P.2d at 873; State v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)). 
Bosier has not claimed the action by the district court in amending Bosier's 
original order of probation to include the term directing his sentence to run 
consecutively to the Canyon County sentences rises to the level of a 
fundamental error. 
The question of jurisdiction is fundamental, and may be brought to the 
court's attention at any time. State v. Lundauist, 134 ldaho 831, 835, 11 P.3d 27, 
31 (2000). Bosier does assert that the district court was without jurisdiction. 
However, Bosier provides no authority for the proposition that the issue of a court 
exceeding its authority on remand is a jurisdictional issue. State v. Zichko, 129 
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered.") As such, Bosier has failed to properly preserve the issue of 
whether or not the district court acted within its discretion to amend the judgment 
reinstating his original probation to reflect the court's intent that the underlying 
sentence run consecutively to Bosier's Canyon County sentences. 
D. If Preserved For Appeal, On Remand. The District Court Followed The 
Directive Of The Court Of A~peals In Reinstatina Bosier's Oriainal 
Probation 
If the issue is determined to be preserved for appeal, Bosier has failed to 
show that the district court acted outside its jurisdiction in amending the judgment 
to reflect his sentence was to run consecutively to the Canyon County sentences. 
Following remand, the district court held a hearing at which it noted the original 
judgment failed to indicate whether the sentence was to run consecutive to or 
concurrent with the sentences in the Canyon County cases. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 19- 
23.) The court stated its intent that the sentence be consecutive. (Tr., p. 6, L. 24 
- p. 7, L. 5 ("It would be the Court's intent, in the event that the Canyon County 
matter was entered as a sentence before this Court sentenced the defendant, 
that this sentence would be consecutive to that.").) 
Bosier argues the district court was without jurisdiction to amend the 
judgment to reflect the court's intent that the sentence run consecutive to the 
Canyon County sentences. Specifically, Bosier asserts the order of the Court of 
Appeals to reinstate Bosier's original probation left the district court with only a 
ministerial act and the amendment was beyond the scope of that act. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) Bosier relies on State v. Hosey, 134 ldaho 883, 11 
P.3d 1101 (2000), Hummer v. Evans, 132 ldaho 830,979 P.2d 1188 (1999), and 
I.A.R. 38 in support of his jurisdictional argument. Hosey, Hummer, and I.A.R. 38 
do not support Bosier's argument that the district court acted without authority 
when, in reinstating Bosier's probation, the court amended Bosier's judgment to 
reflect that his sentence would run consecutive to the Canyon County sentences. 
"The general rule is that, on remand, a trial court has the authority to take 
actions it is specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the 
actions directed by the appellate court." Hosey, 134 ldaho at 886, 11 P.3d at 
1104 (citation omitted). The Court in Hummer, in holding that the trial court was 
without jurisdiction to address the issue of attorney's fees following a remand for 
entry of an amended judgment, noted that "[a] trial court has no authority to enter 
any judgment or order not in conformity with the order of the appellate court." 
Hummer, 132 ldaho at 833, 979 P.2d at 1191 (quoting Walters. v. Industrial 
Indemnity Company, 130 ldaho 836 949, P.2d 22 (1997)). Contrary to Bosier's 
assertion, the district court's actions on remand were, as required by Hummer, 
"in conformity with" the Court of Appeals' directive. The district court reinstated 
Bosier's original probation. ' While the district court also amended the judgment 
to address a matter previously overlooked -- the consecutive or concurrent 
nature of Bosier's sentence as it related to his previously imposed Canyon 
County sentences -- such amendment merely addressed an issue subsidiary to 
and in conformity with the act of reinstating Bosier's probation as directed by the 
Court of Appeals. Bosier has failed to establish otherwise. 
Bosier's argument that amending the judgment to reflect whether his 
sentence was consecutive or concurrent with his Canyon County sentences fails. 
The Court of Appeals did not reach, nor was it presented, any claim having to do 
with the concurrent or consecutive nature of the sentence. On the contrary, the 
court ultimately concluded only that Bosier was entitled to reinstatement of his 
probation. Once that is accomplished, Bosier has received the full benefit of the 
Court of Appeals' order. Whether his sentence runs concurrently or 
' Bosier argues and the state concedes that the district court erroneously 
amended the judgment to modiv the start date of Bosier's probation in this case. 
The judgment should therefore be amended to include the original language that 
Bosier's probation commenced on October 3, 2007. 
consecutively if that probation is violated is merely subsidiary to the Court of 
Appeals' mandate. 
Bosier's argument on appeal appears to rely on the premise that the 
original judgment vested a right to have this sentence run concurrent to the 
Canyon County sentences. Bosier has failed to cite to any authority that he was 
entitled to such a presumption. Absent such a showing, the district court had the 
authority to impose a consecutive sentence and did not lose jurisdiction on 
remand to do so.2 See State v. Cisneros-Gonzalez, 141 Idaho 494, 112 P.3d 
782 (2004) (Idaho courts have a common law discretionary power to impose 
sentences cumulative to those previously imposed). 
Because Bosier has failed to show that he had the presumption of a 
concurrent sentence, he has failed to show that the district court acted outside of 
the authority given it by the Court of Appeals on remand to amend the judgment 
Bosier also relies on I.A.R. 38 in support of his jurisdictional argument, 
however, such reliance is also misplaced. As it relates to the issuance of 
remittiturs, the rule provides: 
When the opinion filed has become final in accordance with this 
rule, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall issue and file a remittitur 
with the district court or administrative agency appealed from and 
mail copies to all parties to the appeal and to the presiding district 
judge or chairman of the agency. The remittitur shall advise the 
district court or administrative agency that the opinion has become 
final and that the district court or administrative agency shall 
forthwith comply with the directive of the opinion. 
I.A.R. 38 (c). Bosier incorrectly asserts that the district court was in violation of 
the provisions of I.A.R. 38 because "[ilnstead of performing the task directed to it" 
by the Court of Appeals, the "district court unilaterally determined that it wanted 
to sentence Mr. Bosier anew." (Appellant's brief, p. 10.) Because the district 
court did in fact comply with the directive of the opinion issued by the Court of 
Appeals by reinstating Bosier's original probation, Bosier's claim that the district 
court violated Rule 38 also fails. 
reinstating his original probation to reflect the court's intent that Bosier's 
underlying sentence run consecutive to his Canyon County cases. 
11. 
Bosier Has Failed to Show That His Sentence On Remand Was Imposed In A 
Vindictive Manner 
Bosier asserts for the first time on appeal that the same district court judge 
who originally sentenced him impermissibly increased his sentence because 
Bosier was successful on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17.) Initially, it is the 
I state's position that Bosier has failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal by 
failing to raise it in front of the district court, which was in the best position to 
I outline the reasons other than vindictiveness, if present, that any perceived 
increase in Bosier's sentence occurred. Carlson, 134 Idaho at 398, 3 P.3d at 76 
I 
("it is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection 
I 
must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."). 
If the court does conclude that Bosier's claim that his sentence upon 
remand was imposed in a vindictive manner has been properly preserved for 
appeal, the only remaining issue for this Court to determine based on the state's 
earlier concession that the extension of Bosier's probationary period by atmost 
two years was improper, is whether the pronouncement that Bosier's sentence 
run consecutive to the sentences previously imposed in the Canyon County 
cases in accordance with the district court's intent was an increase of Bosier's 
sentence done for the purpose of punishing Bosier for exercising his right to an 
appeal. Bosier has failed to show that the sentence he received on remand was 
a harsher sentence motivated by his successful appeal. 
A court violates a defendant's constitutional due process rights when it 
imposes a heavier sentence "if the motivation for the heavier sentence was to 
penalize the defendant" for exercising his rights. State v. Clark, 136 ldaho 529, 
534, 37 P.3d 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711, 725-26 (1969), rev'd. in part Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 
2201 (1989)). Where the sentence is harsher, there is generally a "'presumption 
of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only by objective information in the 
record justihing the increased sentence."' Clark, 136 ldaho at 531, 37 P.3d at 28 
(quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982)). 
Bosier fails to support his assertion that the district court sought to 
increase his sentence after a successful appeal. As explained above, the district 
court did not, in fact, increase Bosier's sentence on remand. The amendment to 
the reinstatement of Bosier's original probation merely effectuated the district 
court's intent to run the underlying sentence consecutive to the previously 
imposed Canyon County cases. Running the sentence consecutively did not 
actually increase the length of the sentence. As such, Bosier has failed to 
establish a claim of vindictiveness. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court uphold the district court's 
third amended judgment of conviction in all respects except the condition 
providing for commencement 
I 
I 
Dated this 16 '~  day of March, 
I 
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